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Women's International League for Peace
and Freedom, Fresno Branch v. City of
Fresno: Free Speech Access to
Transit Cars Under the
California Constitution
by LISA F. GRAUL*
Introduction
In Women's International League for Peace and Freedom,
Fresno Branch v. City of Fresno (WILPF),1 a California court of
appeal recently held constitutional a city ordinance which pro-
hibits all forms of political advertising, yet allows commercial
advertising, on the city's buses or transit property. In reaching
this conclusion the court held that under the California Consti-
* A.B., University of California at Berkeley; Member, Third Year Class. The
author would like to thank Leslie Graul for her word processing assistance.
1. 186 Cal. App. 3d 30, 237 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1986), rev. granted, 718 P.2d 909, 226
Cal. Rptr. 547 (1986), rev. dismissed, 737 P.2d 771, 237 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1987). On No-
vember 4, 1986, long after review of WILPF had been granted by the California
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rose Bird and Justices Cruz Reynoso and Joseph
Grodin failed to win approval by a majority of the California electorate in their quest
for confirmation. Their terms officially ended on January 5, 1987. The unprece-
dented defeat of the justices provided "Governor Deukmejian with the power to mold
a new, more conservative Supreme Court that is likely to... alter the direction of
California law for years to come." San Francisco Chron., Nov. 5, 1986, at 1, col. 4. On
May 14, 1987, the California Supreme Court, comprised of its new members, dismissed
review of WILPF and remanded to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. 737
P.2d 771, 237 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1987). The order was signed by Chief Justice Lucas and
Justices Panelli, Arguelles, Eagleson and Kaufman. Justice Mosk was of the opinion
the matter should be retained and did not sign the order.
2. 186 Cal. App. 3d at 41, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 584. See Fresno Municipal Code, which
provides: "No political advertising matter or sign shall be displayed upon any bus or
on transit property." FRESNO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2-2809 (c) (1978). It is unclear
from the wording of this statute whether the prohibition applies to the interior or
exterior of public buses or both. While Fresno Transit's practice was to provide space
for advertising both in and on its buses, WILPF, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 237 Cal. Rptr.
at 578, the holding in WILPF refers only to "the area within a transit bus." Id. at 41,
237 Cal. Rptr. at 584. Thus, for purposes of this Note, all analysis will concern the
inside of public buses unless otherwise indicated.
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tution the area within a public bus is not a public forum.-
Although the court purported to act under the California Con-
stitution,4 its ruling followed the reasoning articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights,5 which addressed the precise issue raised in WILPF,
but within the context of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution.
As a matter of first amendment law, Lehman overruled an
earlier California Supreme Court ruling on this subject. In
Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District,7 the court
held violative of the first amendment a local regulation which
permitted commercial and election advertisements in public
buses while denying access to other political advertisements.8
The court reasoned that by providing facilities for advertise-
ments, the district had "opened the forum" for the expression
of ideas, and therefore could not for reasons of administrative
convenience decline advertisements expressing opinions and
beliefs protected by the first amendment, including political ad-
vertising.' Although Lehman undoubtedly overruled Wirta for
first amendment purposes, 0 Wirta nonetheless should have
been recognized "as an explicit articulation of what the highest
court in our State considers freedom of speech,... insofar as it
relates to transit bus advertising."" By following the reasoning
of Lehman, the WILPF court failed to fully implement the Cal-
ifornia Constitution's "liberty of speech" clause which affords
greater free speech protection than its federal counterpart. 2
Part I of this Note summarizes the Wirta and Lehman deci-
sions, providing an overview of the state and federal legal his-
3. 186 Cal. App. 3d at 41, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 584. "Public forum analysis adds a
frequently significant location-specific dimension - or at least an inquiry of whether
the values of free expression are involved in a given case." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 987 (2d ed. 1988).
4. 186 Cal. App. 3d at 41, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
5. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
6. Id. at 299.
7. 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).
8. Id. at 63, 434 P.2d at 990, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
9. Id. at 55, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
10. WILPF, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 35, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
11. Id. at 33, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (quoting the trial court opinion).
12. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908, 592 P.2d 341, 346,
153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859, (1979), ffl'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Wilson v. Superior Court, 13
Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975). See also Note, Redis-
covering the California Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481 (1974). For the
full text of the California Constitution's "liberty of speech" clause see infra note 76.
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tory pertaining to transit car advertising. Part II briefly
outlines the WILPF decision. Part III analyzes whether the
California court of appeal correctly decided whether a munici-
pality which permits commercial advertising on local public
transit buses may constitutionally exclude political bus plac-
ards.' s Although neither Lehman nor Wirta were binding on
the court of appeal, this Note proposes that the court should
not have followed Lehman. While Lehman was decided on
facts identical to those of WILPF, Lehman involved the public
forum doctrine under the first amendment to the United States
Constitution, which is not as protective of speech as the Califor-
nia Constitution.14 Rather, the court of appeal should have
found the Fresno ordinance unconstitutional under Wirta's
"opened the forum"'5 analysis.
I
State and Federal Legal Background of Transit
Car Advertising
A. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District
In Wirta, an association called Women for Peace requested
that it be allowed to place an anti-war advertisement on the
Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District's buses.'" The district
refused to accept the advertisement because it violated the dis-
trict's advertising policy of prohibiting political messages unre-
lated to an election.' Women for Peace sought an injunction
13. Although it is possible that the League's advertisement could have been
banned on the theory that its text is not constitutionally protected speech, that issue
was not reached by the court of appeal and is beyond the scope of this Note. 186 Cal.
App. 3d at 42, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
14. See i'fra text accompanying notes 149-55.
15. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
16. Wirta, 68 Cal. 2d at 53, 434 P.2d at 984, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 432. The text of the
advertisement read as follows:
"Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind."
President John F. Kennedy.
Write to President Johnson: Negotiate Vietnam.
Women for Peace
P.O. Box 944, Berkeley
Is
17. Id The advertising policy read as follows:
The... District... accepts only commercial advertising for the sale of goods
and services, except that political advertising will be accepted in connection
with and at the time of a duly called election being held within the bounda-
ries of the District, and further subject to the conditions that (a) each adver-
tisement bear an approved disclaimer and an indication that the
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compelling the district to accept and display their signs.' s The
trial court granted the injunction, finding the district's conduct
violative of the group's right to freedom of speech and equal
protection under the laws.19 The California Supreme Court
affirmed.20
In an opinion written by Justice Mosk, the California
Supreme Court briefly disposed of the public forum issue, de-
claring that the district's decision "to accept advertising on its.
motor coaches serves as its considered conclusion that this form
of communication will not interfere with [the transit system's]
primary function of providing transportation."12 ' The question
before the court was therefore reduced to whether the district,
having opened the forum for the expression of ideas by provid-
ing advertising space, could constitutionally accept advertise-
ments for the sale of goods and services and political campaign
messages, while denying all other advertisements access to the
forum.2 The court held that this practice was constitutionally
advertisement was placed by an advertising agency, and (b).space be made
equally available to opposing candidates or sides of a ballot measure.
18. Id at 54, 434 P.2d at 984, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
19. 1d
20. Id. at 55, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
21. 1d at 54, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
22. Id at 55, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433. Wirta's "opened the forum"
analysis has its roots in the California Supreme Court decision of Danskin v. San Di-
ego Unified School District, 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946). There the court held it
unconstitutional for a school board to prohibit certain persons or classified groups
whom it considered subversive from exercising their rights of free speech and assem-
bly in places at schools where others were allowed to speak and assemble. The court
reasoned:
The state is under no duty to make school buildings available for public
meetings.... If it elects to do so, however, it cannot arbitrarily prevent any
members of the public from holding such meetings.... The convictions or
affiliations of one who requests the use of a school building as a forum are of
no more concern to the school administrators than to a superintendent of
parks or streets if the forum is the green or the market place.... The very
purpose of a forum is the interchange of ideas, and that purpose cannot be
frustrated by a censorship that would label certain convictions and affilia-
tions suspect, denying the privilege of assembly to those Who hold them, but
granting it to those whose convictions and affiliations happen to be accepta-
ble and in effect amplifying their privilege by making it a special one.... It is
not for the state to control the influence of a public forum by censoring-the
ideas, the proponents, or the audience.... Those who are under the ban of
the statute could not hold a meeting to pronounce their views with regard to
pending legislation, constitutional amendments, election of political candi-
dates, or even artistic or educational matters.
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impermissible. While the court recognized that the district
did not discriminate between points of view, its practice of
choosing between "classes of ideas" was nonetheless considered
censorship.2 It was further deemed a perversion of acceptable
first amendment priorities to afford unlimited forum access to
commercial messages, while banning the vast majority of other
speech protected by the first amendment.2 While it was deter-
mined that a balance must be struck between the competing
demands of freedom of speech and other societal interests wor-
thy of protection, the court found that here no valid conflicting
interests existed.2
Nonetheless, the court briefly addressed the district's conten-
tion that passengers on motor coaches are a "captive audience,"
and that if anti-war messages like the one in question are dis-
played, persons riding the bus would be subjected to the blare
of political propaganda.' The court dismissed this claim, find-
ing no indication that political speech is potentially more offen-
sive than commercial speech.28 In addition, the court noted the
fact that one's right to privacy is diminished outside of his
home and is subject to reasonable limitations in relation to the
rights of others.29
While the court conceded that the district is permitted to im-
pose non-discriminatory "time, place and manner" restrictions
on speech to the extent necessary to fairly administer its adver-
tising space,' a restriction as potentially unlimited in scope as
the one imposed here could only be justified by a showing of a
"clear and present danger that a serious substantive evil
[would] result."31 No such assertion had been made.3
In his dissent, Justice Burke rejected the idea that the dis-
trict, by providing advertising facilities, had opened the forum
Id. at 545-51, 171 P.2d at 891-94 (citations omitted), quoted in Wirta, 68 Cal. 2d at 55-
56, 434 P.2d at 985-86, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34.
23. 68 Cal. 2d at 55, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
24. I& at 56, 434 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
25. Id. at 56-57, 434 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
26. Id. at 59-60, 434 P.2d at 988, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
27. Id at 60-61 n.3, 434 P.2d at 988-89 n.3, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 436-37 n.3.
28. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 179-82.
29. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 183-84.
30. 68 Cal. 2d. at 62, 434 P.2d at 990, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 438. See also infra text accom-
panying notes 111-13.
31. 68 Cal. 2d. at 60, 434 P.2d at 988, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
32. I
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for the expression of ideas.33 On the contrary, Justice Burke
argued that the district's attempt to contractually limit the
scope of the forum was a constitutionally viable means of keep-
ing away unwanted business.34 Given that commercial speech
was then without constitutional protection, Justice Burke saw
no prospect of infringing on first amendment rights so long as
the forum remained closed to the vast majority of protected
speech.35 Thus, according to Justice Burke, the district should
enjoy unfettered discretion in accepting or rejecting advertise-
ments, thereby minimizing the chances of posting offensive or
controversial messages.36 In Justice Burke's view, decisions
concerning the kind of advertising that will be accepted are
managerial matters governed only by a concern for maximizing
profits and providing better serviceY' This policy he found
to be neither unreasonable nor unconstitutionally discrim-
inatory.38
Seven years later, the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of free speech access to transit buses in a case
involving facts similar to Wirta, However, under the federal
analysis, the Court reached a different conclusion than that
reached by the California Supreme Court.
33. Id. at 63, 434 P.2d at 990, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 438 (Burke, J., dissenting).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 64, 434 P.2d at 991, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 439. Justice Burke reasoned:
With but one very limited exception, the district board has expressly re-
stricted the use of the bus display cards to commercial advertising for the sale
of goods and services. The exception pertains to a reservation of space for
use by candidates and by proponents of ballot measures (opponents, too) in
local elections. There, however, as the majority point out, the board and de-
fendant advertising agency have gone beyond the call of duty in order to af-
ford all candidates and both sides of every local election issue full
opportunity to expose their views, even to the extent of searching out the
opponents and informing them of the opportunity to utilize card space to
make their views known. Certainly, there can be no criticism of board policy
with respect to the exercise of First Amendment rights as they may involve
local elections.
Id. at 64, 434 P.2d at 990-91, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 64, 434 P.2d at 992, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
37. Id. at 65, 434 P.2d at 991-92, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 440 ("The board must exercise
business and managerial judgment in carrying out its responsibilities. The decision to
augment revenues by selling advertising space on the district's buses (sic] is such an
exercise of managerial judgment. Likewise is the decision with respect to the kinds of
advertising matter that will be accepted.").
38. Id.at 66, 434 P.2d at 992, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
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B. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights
Harry J. Lehman, petitioner, sought to promote his candi-
dacy for state representative to the Ohio General Assembly by
purchasing car card space on the Shaker Heights Rapid Transit
System 9 The system's advertising agent informed him that
although space was then available, the company's contract with
the city forbade the display of political messages.40 The system
did, however, accept commercial and social service advertise-
ments.41 Petitioner unsuccessfully sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief in the state courts of Ohio.42 On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the city's
refusal to accept petitioner's advertisement violated neither the
first amendment right of free speech 43 nor the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment."
A plurality of the Court, led by Justice Blackmun, found
39. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 299. Shaker Heights is a city within the district petitioner
sought to represent. Id. The text of his proposed ad read:
HARRY J. LEHMAN IS OLD-FASHIONED!
ABOUT HONESTY, INTEGRITY AND GOOD GOVERNMENT.
State Representative-District 56
[x] Harry J. Lehman.
ICE
. 40. 1d at 300. The contract provided in relevant part: "The Contractor shall not
place political advertising in or upon any of the said Cars or in, upon or about any
other additional and further space granted hereunder." I& at 299-300.
41. I& Trial testimony revealed that during its 26 years of public operation, the
Shaker Heights System had not permitted any political or public issue advertising. Id
at 300-01.
42. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 34 Ohio St. 2d 143,145,296 N.E.2d 683, 684-
85 (1973). The Supreme Court of Ohio held that "the constitutionally protected right
of free speech with respect to forums for oral speech, or the dissemination of litera-
ture on a city's streets, does not extend to commercial or political advertising on rapid
transit vehicles." I& at 145-46, 296 N.E.2d at 685. The court said there was no equal
protection violation because, "[a]s a class, all candidates for political office are treated
alike under the Shaker Heights Rapid Transit System's commercial advertising pol-
icy." I& at 148, 296 N.E.2d at 686.
43. 418 U.S. at 304. The first amendment to the United States Constitution reads
in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. 418 U.S. at 304. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
45. Justice Blackmun announced the decision of the Court and was joined by
Chief Justice Burger, Justice White and Justice Rehnquist.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
that the advertising space within a city's transit system is not a
public forum under the first amendment.46 The Court ruled
that the degree of free speech protection afforded must be re-
solved by balancing "the nature of the forum and the conflict-
ing interests involved. ' 47 The Court analyzed the nature of the
forum in light of its purpose: to operate as part of a commercial
venture engaged in the business of public transportation. 48 The
Court explained that unlike for a meeting hall, park, street cor-
ner or other traditional public forum, the city's first priority
was, and should have been, to "provide rapid, convenient, pleas-
ant, and inexpensive service to the commuters of Shaker
Heights." 49 Selling advertising space, although only incidental
to the public transportation business, was found to be part of
the commercial venture.50 Accordingly, the city was given dis-
cretion to make reasonable choices concerning the types of ad-
vertising it wished to display in its transit cars.51 Balancing
petitioner's first amendment rights against the city's business
interests, the Court concluded that the justifications for limit-
ing car card space to commercial advertising - minimizing "the
chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of
imposing on a captive audience" - were legitimate government
interests satisfying both first amendment and equal protection
requirements.5 2
46. 418 U.S. at 304.
47. I& at 302-03.
48. I, at 303.
49. I&
50. I&
51. 1&
52. Id at 304.
Because state action exists, however, the policies and practices governing
access to the transit system's advertising space must not be arbitrary, capri-
cious, or invidious. Here, the city has decided that "[p]urveyors of goods and
services saleable in commerce may purchase advertising space on an equal
basis, whether they be house builders or butchers." 34 Ohio St. 2d at 146, 296
N.E.2d at 685. This decision is little different from deciding to impose a 10-,
25-, or 35-cent fare, or from changing schedules or the location of bus stops,
Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. at 465. Revenue earned from
long-term commercial advertising could be jeopardized by a requirement that
short-term candidacy or issue oriented advertisements be displayed on car
cards. Users would be subjected to the blare of political propaganda. There
could be lurking doubts about favoritism, and sticky administrative problems
might arise in parceling out limited space to eager politicians. In these cir-
cumstances, the managerial decision to limit car card space to innocuous and
less controversial commercial and service oriented advertising does not rise
to the dignity of a First Amendment violation. Were we to hold to the con-
trary, display cases in public hospitals, libraries, office buildings, military
[Vol. 10:829
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Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, discussed the
right of the commuters "to be free from forced intrusions on
their privacy."' ' In his view, the commuters' right to privacy
precluded the city from transforming its transit cars into fora
for the dissemination of ideas.4 In whatever form - visual or
aural, commercial or political - he found any one message to
be as potentially offensive and impossible to ignore as the
others.M In light of the captive nature of the commuter audi-
ence, Justice Douglas argued that the audience's right to be
free from forced intrusions on its privacy outweighed peti-
tioner's right to force his message upon it.5'
In a powerful dissent, Justice Brennan57 recognized two fac-
tors to be balanced in determining whether the inside of a pub-
lic transit vehicle is a public forum: (1) the importance of the
property's primary function; and (2) the extent to which that
function will be hampered if access for free speech is permit-
ted.58 However, Brennan concluded that the facts in this case
enabled these specific assessments to be avoided." Justice
Brennan argued that the city had voluntarily established a fo-
rum for communication when it allowed advertising placards
within its transit cars and hired an agent to administer access to
that forum.6e By making car card space available to commer-
cial and public service advertising, Brennan reasoned that the
city had effectively denied itself the defense that advertising is
incompatible with the public transportation business.'1
Brennan asserted that once a first amendment forum was es-
tablished, free speech and equal protection principles prohib-
ited content-based discrimination.6e He argued that it was
equally impermissible to discriminate against entire classes of
compounds, and other public facilities immediately would become Hyde
Parks open to every would-be pamphleteer and politician. This the Constitu-
tion does not require.
IE at 303-04.
53. Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
54. I& at 307-08.
55. I&
56. Id, at 308.
57. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell.
58. 418 US. at 312.
59. I& at 313-14.
60. I& at 314.
61. Id.
62. I at 315.
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speech as against viewpoints within a given class." While
Brennan acknowledged that content-neutral "time, place and
manner" restrictions are permissible if narrowly tailored to
protect the viability of the forum's primary function, he urged
that the facts of this case could not withstand the test of strict
scrutiny." In particular, Justice Brennan underlined the ab-
surdity of the proposition that political advertisements are
more disruptive to transportation than are commercial adver-
tisements.6 Justice Brennan concluded that the transit sys-
tem's practice of excluding political advertisements violated
petitioner's first amendment rights.66
II
The WILPF Decision
In Women's International League for Peace and Freedom,
Fresno Branch v. City of Fresno,67 on facts similar to those in
Lehman, a California court of appeal evaluated the Supreme
Court's opinion of Lehman in light of the California Constitu-
tion. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
(League), an association opposed to war or the preparation for
war,e posted inside Fresno public buses placards which dis-
played the message:
Why is this the only job our government has to offer 19-20 year
olds?
THINK BEFORE YOU REGISTER FOR THE DRAFT.69
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.
Fresno, California 93704
63. Id. at 316.
64. Id, at 316-17.
65. Id. at 317-21. Justice Brennan stated:
A commercial advertisement peddling snowmobiles would be accepted, while
a counter-advertisement calling upon the public to support legislation con-
trolling the environmental destruction and noise pollution caused by snow-
mobiles would be rejected. Alternatively, a public service ad by the League of
Women Voters would be permitted, advertising the existence of an upcoming
election and imploring citizens to vote, but a candidate, such as Lehman,
would be barred from informing the public about his candidacy, qualifica-
tions for office, or position on particular issues.
Id. at 317.
66. Id. at 310.
67. WILPF, 186 Cal. App. 3d 30, 237 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1986), rev. granted, 718 P.2d
909, 226 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1986), rev. dismissed, 737 P.2d 771, 237 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1987).
68. Id. at 32, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
69. Id.
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The Fresno City Manager had the signs removed.70 When
the League protested, the city explained that the decision was
justified under Fresno Municipal Code section 2-2809(c),71
which prohibits political advertising on any bus or transit
property.'
The League then brought an action in superior court against
the city and various city officials challenging the statute and
the city's action.73 The court found the ordinance unconstitu-
tional, holding that once the city agreed to accept commercial
advertising on its buses, they became public forums open to
political beliefs and ideas.74 The court of appeal reversed.75
The issue before the court of appeal concerned the effect of
article I, section 2 of the California Constitution on the
League's advertisement.76 The court recognized that the Cali-
fornia Constitution may afford broader free speech protection
than the federal Constitution." In searching for the California
rule, the court first examined Wirta. 7 8 The court distinguished
Wirta in several respects.79 While the transit district policy in-
volved in Wirta allowed some forms of political advertising, the
Fresno ordinance completely excluded political messages.80
The court argued that Wirta's "opened the forum" analysis fo-
cused on political censorship, condemning the practice of choos-
ing between "classes of ideas entitled to constitutional
protection.... 81 The court further distinguished Wirta as a
first amendment case which did not attempt to construe the
California Constitution.'
70. Id. at 33, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
71. This section provides: "No political advertising matter or sign shall be dis-
played upon any bus or on transit property." FRESNO, CAL., MUNCIPAL CODE § 2-
2809(c) (1978).
72. 186 Cal. App. 3d at. 33, 237 Cal. Rptr at 578.
73. Id. at 32, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 42, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
76. Id. at 36, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 580. The California Constitution provides: "Every
person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of
speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a).
77. WILPF, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 37-38, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
78. d. at35, 237 Cal. Rptr at 581.
79. Id. at 39-40, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
80. Id. at 35, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
81. Id. at 36,237 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
82. Id. at 39, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
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The court acknowledged that Lehman, which was decided by
the highest court in the nation, was controlling on the public
forum issue under the first amendment.' However, it pointed
out that California cases continue to cite Wirta," thereby rais-
ing the question of whether Wirta, although technically a first
amendment case, survived Lehman as an exposition of Califor-
nia constitutional law by incorporation. 5 The court deter-
mined that although subsequent California cases had adopted
the Wirta decision as an example of state constitutional inde-
pendence, such adoption did not mean that Lehman was incom-
patible with California law.8e Neither decision being binding,
the court opted to follow the reasoning articulated in Lehman.
Relying heavily on Justice Douglas' captive audience theory,
the court held that the privacy rights of passengers on a public
transit bus outweigh any free speech concerns, and therefore,
under the California Constitution, a public forum does not ex-
ist.' Section 2-2809(c) was thus found constitutional.88
III
Analysis: May a California Municipality Which
Permits Commercial Advertising on its
Buses Constitutionally Exclude
Political Messages?
In Lehman, on facts almost identical to those of WILPF, the
United States Supreme Court found that advertising space in
buses is not a public forum under the federal Constitution. 9
While there is little doubt that the Court's opinion in Lehman
is decisive on the public forum issue for first amendment pur-
poses,90 arguably a different result should be reached under the
California Constitution.
83. Id at 35, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
84. Id at 38, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 581. The court cited, for example, Committee to
Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 267, 625 P.2d 779, 787, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1981).
85. 186 Cal. App. 3d at 38, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
86. Id at 39, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
87. Id at 41, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
88. Id
89. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304.
90. See WILPF, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 35, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
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A. The Scope of California's "Liberty of Speech" Clause
As the California court of appeal acknowledged, the Califor-
nia Constitution is independent of the federal Constitution and
may in some cases provide greater speech protection.91 While
the free speech provisions of both constitutions command that
no law abridge freedom of speech or of the press, only the Cali-
fornia Constitution grants an express right to speak or write as
one pleases.92 That the authors of the state constitution chose
not to adopt the specific wording of the first amendment sug-
gests that they intended the scope of protection of speech under
the state scheme to be different."
In recent years, both state and federal courts have inter-
preted California's free speech provisions as affording broader
protection for expressive activity than the first amendment
provisions of the United States Constitution." In Robins v.
91. 1d at 37-38, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 581. Accord Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908, 592 P.2d 341, 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859 (1979), qff'd 447
U.S. 74 (1980); Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652,658,532 P.2d 116,120, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 472 (1975); Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94, 97-98, 44 P. 458, 459 (1896).
For other provisions of the California Declaration of Rights that afford greater consti-
tutional protection than parallel federal provisions, see, e.g., People v. Pettingill, 21
Cal. 3d 231, 247, 578 P.2d 108, 118, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 871 (1978)(privilege against self.
incrimination); People v. Hannon, 19 Cal. 3d 588, 606-07 n.8, 564 P.2d 1203, 1214 n.8,
138 Cal. Rptr. 885, 886 n.8 (1977)(right to speedy trial); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 2d
101,114-15, 545 P.2d 272, 280-81, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368-69 (1976)(privilege against self-
incrimination); People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758 n.4, 123
Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 n.4 (1975)(illegal search and seizure); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.
3d 528, 545-52, 531 P.2d 1099, 1110-15, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 326-31 (1975)(fllegal search
and seizure).
92. See aupra notes 43 and 72 and accompanying text.
93. Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS UJ.
481, 494-95 (1974). Even if the texts of the state and federal free speech provisions
were identical, the California Constitution would not be prevented from affording
broader free speech guarantees:
It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually
identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their federal counter-
part. The lesson of history is otherwise: The Bill of Rights was based upon
the corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than the
reverse.... The federal Constitution was designed to guard the states as sov-
ereignties against potential abuses of centralized government; state charters,
however, were conceived as the first and at one time the only line of protec-
tion of the individual against the excesses of local officials.
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 261, 625 P.2d 779,
783, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870 (1981)(quoting People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531
P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975)).
94. Wilson, 13 Cal. 3d at 658,532 P.2d at 120,119 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (The California
Constitution's "liberty of speech" clause is "more definitive and inclusive than the
First Amendment."); see also Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039,1044 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1985); Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at 908, 592 P.2d at 346,153 Cal. Rptr. at 859; U.C. Nuclear
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Pruneyard Shopping Center," the California Supreme Court
held that the state constitution sanctions public access to pri-
vately-owned shopping centers for speech-related activities. 6
This decision not only overruled prior California case law on
the subject,9 but also diverged from first amendment prece-
dent." In reaching its contrary result, the court effectively
reasserted its right to uphold the free speech provisions of the
California Constitution in preference to parallel provisions of
the United States Constitution."
Cases as early as 1896 have pronounced that speech is more
zealously defended under the state constitution than under its
federal counterpart. :° Thus, in Wilson v. Superior Cour4'0
the California Supreme Court wrote that "[a] protective provi-
sion more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment is
contained in our state constitutional guarantee of the right of
free speech and press. ' 1lco While the general language of this
proposition does not alone compel its application in each and
every case, a comparison of federal versus state public forum
doctrine analysis suggests that its application is proper regard-
ing the public forum doctrine.
Weapons Labs Conversion Project v. Lawrence LAvermore Laboratory, 154 Cal. App.
3d 1157, 1164-65, 201 Cal. Rptr. 837, 843-44 (1984); Prisoners Union v. California Dep't
of Corrections, 135 Cal. App. 3d 930, 939, 185 Cal. Rptr. 634, 639 (1982).
95. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
96. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
97. Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974), cerL
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974)(Mosk, J., dissenting). Robins reversed the court's prior
ruling in Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert
denied sub nom. Homart Dev. Co. v. Diamond, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
98. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972).
99. See, e.g., Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d at 247-48, 578 P.2d at 118, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 871;
Diamond, 11 Cal. 3d at 338, 521 P.2d at 465, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 473; Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at
909-10, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859; Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?,
45 WASH. L. REv. 454 (1970); Falk, The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972 - Fore-
word: The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 273, 283 (1973); Note, People v. Pettingill: The Independent State Ground
Debate in California, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 768 (1979); Note, The New Federalism.. To-
ward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 298
(1977); Note, Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center: Free Speech Access to Shopping
Centers Under the California Constitution, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 641 (1980).
100. Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. at 97-98, 42 P. at 459. Accord Robins, 23 Cal.
3d at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859; Wilson, 13 Cal. 3d at 658, 532 P.2d at
120, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
101. 13 Cal. 3d 652, 532 P.2d 116, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
102. 13 Cal. 3d at 658, 532 P.2d at 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
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B. The Public Forum Doctrine
1. Federal Analysis
a. The Public Forum Continuum
Under the first amendment public forum doctrine, there are
two disparate lines of cases. 103 The first line focuses on the na-
ture of the forum and whether it has been dedicated to the use
of speech.104 In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Ed-
ucators Association,l°5 the United States Supreme Court'06 rec-
ognized three classes of public forums. 0 7 At the most protected
end of the spectrum are traditional public forums."l s These fo-
rums consist mainly of streets and parks which "have immemo-
rially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicat-
ing thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions.' '109 When the state regulates protected speech in these
"quintessential public forums," it may only base its restrictions
on the content of the speech being regulated if the regulation is
necessary to serve a "compelling" governmental interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose."10
The Court has implemented two slightly different ap-
proaches for reviewing time, place and manner restrictions.
Under the first method of review a restriction on speech is per-
mitted if
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
103. M.B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, at 4-70 (1984); but rf L. TRIBE, supra note 3 at 994 n.50.
104. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,47 (1966)("rhe State... has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.");
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) ("It is... the business of a military installation
like Fort Dix to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum."); Richmond Newspa-
pers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 599-600 (1980)(Courtrooms, "even more than city
streets, sidewalks and parks" are an area of "traditional First Amendment activity.");
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
105. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
106. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined. Justice Brennan filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens joined.
107. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
108. 1d at 45.
109. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
110. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
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First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest."1'
The second method of review has reduced the first to a three-
pronged test. This method allows time, place and manner re-
strictions only if they (1) are not based on the suppression of a
particular message, (2) are "narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant government interest," and (3) "leave open ample alterna-
tive channels of communication.""' x 2 Thus, whether a
restriction in such a forum may be content-based or must be
content-neutral hinges on the distinction between a "compel-
ling" interest and one which is merely "significant.""'
Limited or semi-public forums consist of property the gov-
ernment has opened to the public for speech activity." 4 This
type of forum can be distinguished from a traditional public fo-
rum in that the government must make an affirmative decision
to open a limited or semi-public forum to the public for expres-
sive activity." 5 Although the government is not required to
create or retain such a forum, once it has been established it is
subject to the same standards that apply to a traditional public
forum."'
The least protected class of forums consists of property
which is neither by tradition nor designation a free speech fo-
rum." 7 Here, the government's election to allow some "selec-
tive access" for expressive activities by nongovernmental
entities serves to create a "nonpublic forum.""18 There is some
debate among scholars regarding the distinction between a lim-
ited or semi-public forum and a nonpublic forum." 9 The deter-
ill. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), reh'g denied 393 U.S. 900
(1968).
112. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Grace, 461 U.S. at 177. According to Nowak, Rotunda
and Young, both methods of review can be reduced to a two-step analysis. The first
concern is whether a regulation is an attempt to censor content. If this is found not to
be the case, the Court will then balance the incidental restriction on speech against
the promotion of significant governmental interests. J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 970-71 (3d ed. 1986).
113. See M.B. NMMER, supra note 103, at 4-71 n.168.
114. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
115. I. (university meeting facilities or school board meetings are examples).
116. d, at 46.
117. Id.
118. Id
119. According to Nimmer, the term limited public forum is synonymous with a
category (3) nonpublic forum, as opposed to a forum by designation which is "limited
to certain purposes." See M. B. NIaER, supra note 103, at 4-71 n.168. Professor Tribe,
on the other hand, sets out the following three categories of forums:
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mination of how to designate a forum is crucial, however, for
the two forum classes are governed by different standards.120
While time, place and manner restrictions must be content-
neutral,'121 access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject
matter and speaker identity if the distinctions drawn are rea-
sonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are
viewpoint-neutral. 12
b. The Incompatibility Standard
The second line of federal public forum cases follows the "in-
compatibility" standard.2 Here it is of little importance
whether the forum is dedicated to uses which would include
the speech activities at issue.1l 4 The concern here is "whether
the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."'' 1
(1) traditional, "quintessential public forums" - "places which by long tradi-
tion or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate," such
as "streets and parks;" (2) "limited purpose" or state-created semi-public fo-
rums opened "for use by the public as a place for expressive activity," such as
university meeting facilities or school board meetings; and, finally, (3) public
property "which is not by tradition or designation for public communication"
at all. I TRIBE, supra note 3, at 987.
Recent case law suggests that Tribe is correct in referring to the three categories as
public forums, limited public forums, and nonpublic forums. Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 814 (1985)(Blackmun, J., dissenting)("The
court ... concedes... that 'a public forum... created by government designation of a
place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for assembly and
speech, for use by certain speaker,% or for the discussion of certain subjects' is a lim-
ited public forum.")(quoting from the majority opinion). Id at 802 (emphasis added in
the dissent).
120. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
121. Ic, See e.g., Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
(ordinance banning "for sale" and "sold" signs for the purpose of stemming the flight
of white homeowners from racially integrated town invalidated; ordinance concerned
with content of speech); Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)("when the board sits in public meetings to conduct
public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be required to discriminate
between speakers on the basis of their employment, or the content of their speech").
122. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49. Thus, the fact that in Lehman the city had for 26 years
limited access to advertising space to commercial ads, and that the city's management
contract required the managing company to exercise control over the subject matter
of the displays, served as evidence of the city's intent to create a nonpublic forum.
Additionally, the court found that the city's use of the property as a commercial enter-
prise was inconsistent with an intent to designate the transit vehicle cards as a public
forum. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 298-304.
123. See M. B. NIMMER, supra note 103, at 4-72.
124. Id
125. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); Schad v. Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 74 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843 (1976)(Powell, J.,
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It would appear that the incompatibility standard is often
more protective of speech than the Perry standard. For exam-
ple, as one commentator points out: "Most public premises,
apart from streets and parks, are not dedicated or intended for
speech activities, and yet such activities within reasonably de-
fined limits may not be in the least incompatible with the mis-
sion for which such premises are intended." In such a
situation, a restriction on speech might be held constitutional
under Perry and unconstitutional under the incompatibility
standard.
In theory these standards are separate and distinct; in prac-
tice they overlap, causing much confusion. Under the Perry
nonpublic forum analysis, the reasonableness of restrictions is
to be evaluated relative to the extent to which speech would
interfere with the intended purpose of the premises.12 . The
nonpublic forum element of Perry has given rise within the
Court to a dispute as to whether the element requires applica-
tion of the incompatibility standard.12' Recently, a majority of
the Court held that "[i]n contrast to a public forum, a finding of
strict incompatibility between the nature of the speech or the
identity of the speaker and the functioning of the nonpublic fo-
rum is not mandated."12 While the dissenters argued that the
incompatibility standard should be given its full effect regard-
less of the nature of the forum,13° apparent incompatibility be-
concurring); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (1981); United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 185 (1983)(Marshall, J., concurring).
126. See M. B. NiMMER, supra note 103, at 4-72 to 4-73.
127. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
128. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 820-21
(1985). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun stated:
The Court's analysis, it seems to me, turns these principles on end. Rather
than recognize that a nonpublic forum is a place where expressive activity
would be incompatible with the purposes the property is intended to serve,
the Court states that a nonpublic forum is a place where we need not even be
concerned about whether expressive activity is incompatible with the pur-
poses of the property. Rather than taking the nature of the property into
account in balancing the First Amendment interests of the speaker and soci-
ety's interests in freedom of speech against the interests served by reserving
the property to its normal use, the court simply labels the property and dis-
penses with the balancing.
I
129. Id. at 808. Thus, the city's decision in Lehman to limit "access to its transit
system [sic] advertising space in order to minimize chances of abuse, the appearance of
favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience" would undoubtedly be
held constitutional under Perry. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304.
130. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 820-21.
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tween speech and forum is only a concern underlying the Perry
standard insofar as it relates to public and limited public fo-
rums. Thus, the incompatibility standard, applied separately
from Perry, at the very least provides broader speech protec-
tion where a nonpublic forum is concerned. Recent case law
suggests that Perry is now the dominant standard for federal
public forum analysis, and the incompatibility standard is appli-
cable only as a tool in Perry analysis.31 ' California public fo-
rum doctrine, as will be seen, has continued to rely on the
incompatibility standard, thus providing broader speech protec-
tion than federal public forum doctrine.
2. California Analysis
Historically, California public forum doctrine has employed
the incompatibility standard.13 This test was originally articu-
lated in California by Chief Justice Traynor in In Re Hoff-
man.13 In permitting a group of Vietnam war protesters to
distribute literature and discuss the war with people in a Los
Angeles railway station, "the test [was] not whether petition-
ers' use of the station was a railway use but whether it inter-
fered with that use."' The Chief Justice explained that
specific ordinances restricting activities that directly interfered
with the facility's primary function were permissible. It was
not permissible, however, to prohibit first amendmentn activ-
ity solely because the premises were not maintained primarily
for the purpose of providing a free speech forum.1w In conclud-
ing that the distribution of literature would not interfere with
the railway's primary function of providing transportation, the
court held the area within a railway station to be a public
forum.1'
131. Id.
132. In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967); U.C. Nu-
clear Weapons Labs Conversion Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 154 Cal.
App. 3d 1157, 1165, 201 Cal. Rptr. 837, 844 (1984); Prisoners Union v. California Dep't
of Corrections, 135 Cal. App. 3d 930,937, 185 Cal. Rptr. 634, 638 (1982). But cf Gebert
v. Patterson, 186 Cal. App. 3d 868, 874,231 Cal. Rptr. 150,153 (1986)(implementing the
Perry standard).
133. Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at 850-51, 434 P.2d at 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
134. Id.
135. In Robins, the California Supreme Court made it clear that despite references
to the first amendment, Hoffman rested on California constitutional principles. Rob-
ins, 23 Cal. 3d at 908-09, 592 P.2d at 346-47, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
136. Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at 850-51, 434 P.2d at 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
137. IM
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Recent California decisions recognize the federal public fo-
rum continuum.1 8 In Prisoners Union v. California Depart-
ment of Corrections,la a prisoners' rights organization was
permitted to distribute informational literature in the prison
parking lot despite claims that this activity would interfere
with prison security.14° Although a hierarchy of forums was
recognized in this case, the status of the forum did not change
the governing test from the incompatibility standard to one
guided solely by the extent to which the forum was intended as
a platform for speech. 141 In applying the basic incompatibility
test, the court stated that "the fact that a prison is involved is
highly relevant, but not determinative. Ultimately, the answer
depends upon whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time."' 4
Similarly, in UC. Nuclear Weapons Laboratory Conversion
Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory," the court ordered
a nuclear weapons research facility to allow anti-nuclear litera-
ture to be distributed and slide presentations to be made in the
facility's visitors' center." While the court explicitly recog-
nized the public forum continuum,"5 labeling the visitors'
center a "semi-public forum," the expressive activity was none-
138. Geber4 186 Cal. App. 3d at 874,231 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53; U.C Nuclear Weapons
Labs, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 164-65, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44; Prisoners Union, 135 Cal.
App. 3d at 935, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
139. 135 Cal. App. 3d 957, 185 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1982).
140. Id at 932-33, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
141. I at 935, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 636-37.
A hierarchy of forums emerges from the cases. At one extreme - and most
protected from any form of regulation - are areas such as public streets ...
and parks, traditionally recognized as centers for the public communication
of ideas. Less protected are facilities such as libraries and schools, where the
government has the power to limit speech to maintain the order required to
carry on the purpose of those institutions. Least shielded from regulation are
public institutions which do not perform speech-related functions at all -
such as hospitals, jails or military bases. Here the government is free to ex-
clude even peaceful speech and assembly which interferes in any way with
the functioning of those organizations. The basic thrust of these cases is to
limit regulation to that which proscribes expression that is "basically incom-
patible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."
I& (emphasis in the original)(quoting United States v. Douglass, 579 F.2d 545, 548-49
(9th Cir. 1978), quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972)).
142. IdE at 938, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39 (citation omitted).
143. 154 Cal. App. 3d 1157, 201 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1984).
144. Ird at 1169, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
145. Id at 1164, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
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theless subjected to the basic incompatibility test."~
In the preceding cases, the free speech claims were evaluated
as a matter of state constitutional law despite the fact that the
opinions liberally cite first amendment precedent. 47 While
California courts have borrowed concepts from federal public
forum doctrine decisions, they have used their reserved right to
be more protective of speech when deviating from the federal
rule.'" The result is that under the California standard, a fo-
rum, regardless of status, is ultimately subject to the full force
of the basic incompatibility test.' 49 Under this test, speech will
be suppressed only if there is no other way to keep it from
interfering with the primary function of the forum.1 There-
fore, it would appear that California's public forum doctrine
provides a more speech-protective rule than its federal
counterpart.
146. rd at 1168, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 846. In categorizing the area as a "semi-public
forum," the court observe&
In the case at bar, the Visitors Center is an enclosed place owned and oper-
ated by the government and open to the public at large. While it is obviously
distinguishable from a street or park, it is just as clearly distinguishable from
a hospital or prison. The primary purpose of the Center is to disseminate
information. Visitors are allowed to roam freely around the Center, to pick
up literature, study posters and other displays, and presumably to discuss all
they are exposed to. This environment falls somewhere in the middle of the
continuum, in the category Laurence Tribe describes as a "semi-public fo-
rum." Therefore, "[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expres-
sion is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at
a particular time."
Id (citations omitted).
147. U.C Nuclear Weapons Labs, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 1164, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 843;
Prisoners Union, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 942,185 Cal. Rptr. at 641. In RobinA 23 Cal. 3d at
909-10, 592 P.2d at 346-47, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60, the California Supreme Court reaf-
firmed Hoffman, observing that its usefulness as California precedent is not dimin-
ished by the fact that the opinion cited federal law. But cf Gebert, 188 Cal. App. 3d at
874, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53.
148. See Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985); Hoffman,
67 Cal. 2d at 851, 434 P.2d at 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 100; U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs, 154
Cal. App. 3d at 1168, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 846; Prisoners Union, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 935,
185 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
149. Prisoners Union, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 935, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
150. E.g., in Prisoners Union, because the state failed to demonstrate that normal
activities at the prison could not be protected by less restrictive time, place and man-
ner regulations, the court held that prohibition of expressive activity on the prison
parking lot violated the California Constitution's "liberty of speech" clause. Ld. at 940-
42, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 639-41.
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a. The Inapplicability of Lehman to California Public
Forum Doctrine
The court of appeal in WILPF found Lehman to be compati-
ble with California law,15' and therefore relied on Lehman in
reaching its holding."" In both cases, the courts accepted the
asserted governmental justifications for the transit systems'
prior restraint on speech without considering whether it was
the least speech-restrictive method.'3 While the federal rule
demands only that a restriction on speech in a nonpublic forum
have a rational basis,"" the California standard requires that it
be the least drastic means.15 Therefore, the ready availability'
of alternative solutions should have been recognized and con-
sidered by the WILPF court in evaluating the Fresno
ordinance.
Concededly, the public uproar and proposed boycott in re-
sponse to the League's ad threatened the transportation sys-
tem's vitality by reducing ridership and jeopardizing necessary
state and federal subsidies.1m However, by simply allowing
political advertisements, the city of Fresno need not sacrifice its
transit system on the altar of the marketplace of ideas. For ex-
ample, any fear the city might have that passengers might mis-
interpret political ads as city endorsements of the speaker's
views could be addressed by attaching a disclaimer to each ad-
vertisement. In addition, dissident groups could be encouraged
to respond to political ads by advertising their own political be-
liefs. After all, "a function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute .... That is why freedom of
speech, though not absolute . . . is nevertheless protected
151. WILPF, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 3942, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 578-84.
152. Id
153. Id. at 40, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 579. (quoting Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304).
154. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808. Or Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-04; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46
(asserting a reasonableness requirement, but not commenting on whether a restric-
tion on speech need be the only available solution).
155. Carreras, 768 F.2d at 1044; Prisoners Union, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 940-42, 185
Cal. Rptr. at 639-41.
156. WILPF, No. 265854-0, statement of decision at 10 (Super. Ct. of California,
County of Fresno, May 10, 1982), rev'd 186 Cal. App. 3d 30, 237 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1986).
[Tihe signs were ordered removed because: (1) The placard language con-
tained false and misleading information; . . . (3) contained a "political
message;" and (4) complaints were received from veterans' groups and others
protesting and manifesting "tremendous anger and emotion" over the use of
city buses to advocate the violation of federal law. Veterans' groups consid-
ered a boycott of city buses. (Declaration of Lester A. Morrison.)
IdS (emphasis in original).
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against censorship or punishment .... ,,5 In short, Lehman
does not provide an effective cure for the overbreadth of such
statutes as Fresno Municipal Code section 2-2809(c), as it does
not require that a total prior restraint on speech be the least
drastic means of preventing interference with the transit sys-
tem's primary function.
b. Wirta as an Independent Exposition of California
Law
Had the court of appeal in WILPF followed Wirta, it would
never have needed to arrive at the issue of whether the inside
of a transit car must be made available as a public forum."M For
as the Wirta court recognized, "the determination of the dis-
trict to accept advertising on its motor coaches serves as its con-
sidered conclusion that this form of communication will not
interfere with its primary function of providing transporta-
tion."' 9 The court's ruling on this point was broad, and spoke
to advertising in general. 16 Thus, it was unnecessary for the
WILPF court to apply the basic incompatibility test in deter-
mining whether the advertising space inside a public transit bus
is a public forum. The fact that the city provided facilities for
advertising was enough by itself to open the forum to all
speakers.
The question remains, however, whether Wirta's "opened
the forum" analysis has survived Lehman as an independent
exposition of California constitutional law, and if so, whether it
can be applied to the facts of WILPF. It is immaterial that
Wirta was ostensibly decided under the first amendment for,
as the California Supreme Court has made clear, the citation to
federal precedent in state court decisions does not diminish
their usefulness as guides to the meaning of the California Con-
stitution.161 That subsequent federal decisions on this issue
have taken a different course is also irrelevant.162 In fact, the
157. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
158. Wirta, 68 Cal. 2d at 54, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
159. Id
160. Id Accord Lehman, 418 U.S. at 314 (dissenting opinion); but if. Gonzales v.
Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1124,226 Cal. Rptr. 164, 168 (1986)('%y permit-
ting the display of certain noncommercial signs while prohibiting others, the City has
'opened the forum' and cannot rely on such justifications as aesthetics and traffic
safety to restrict vital noncommercial speech").
161. Robin, 23 Cal. 3d at 908-09, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
162. 1&
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California Supreme Court expressly recognized Wirta as an
example of California's more protective constitutional standard
in view of the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Lehman:
[I]n Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District our court,
applying the principles of Danskin and Bagley, struck down a
discriminatory public transit advertising policy which made ad-
vertising space on public buses available for commercial ex-
pression but denied this "public benefit" to those who wished
to advertise their views upon noncommercial political subjects.
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, however, the United
States Supreme Court, when faced with the identical issue
presented in Wirta, declined to engage in the demanding scru-
tiny called for by the California precedents and sustained the
unequal advertising policy under the federal Constitution.ls'
It is apparent from this statement that the California
Supreme Court still considers Wirta useful precedent under
the California Constitution, and more reliable than Lehman as
an exposition of California's public forum doctrine. Although
the WILPF court purported "to consider the broad implications
of the Wirta case" in "search[ing] for the California rule,"'" it
determined that the factual differences in Wirta diminished its
usefulness in light of Lehman.las Focusing on the fact that in
Wirta the city permitted election-related propaganda while de-
nying all other political messages, the court reasoned that the
ruling's emphasis was on political censorship: "The vice is not
Past decisions on speech and private property testify to the strength of "lib-
erty of speech" in this state. Diamond I [Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477
P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr 501 (1970)] held that distributing leaflets and soliciting
initiative signatures at a shopping center are constitutionally protected.
Though the court relied partly on federal law, California precedents also
were cited. (Citations omitted.) The fact that those opinions cited federal law
that subsequently took a divergent course does not diminish their usefulness
as precedent. (Citations omitted.) The duty of this court is to help determine
what "liberty of speech" means in California. Federal principles are relevant
but not conclusive so long as federal rights are protected.
Id. (. People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 247, 578 P.2d 108, 118, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 871
(1978) (declining to follow Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975)); Serrano v. Priest,
18 Cal. 3d 728, 760-68, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (declining to follow San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
163. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 267, 625
P.2d 779,787, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 874 (1981)(citations omitted)("As these cases indicate,
for at least the past decade the federal decisions in this area have not been a reliable
barometer of the governing California constitutional principles.").
164. WILPF, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 36-37, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
165. Id at 38, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
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that the district has preferred one point of view over another,
but that it chooses between classes of ideas entitled to constitu-
tional protection, sanctioning the expression of only those se-
lected, and banning all others. ' '1"
While it is true that political censorship is one practice the
Wirta court condemned, it was not the crux of the holding."6 7
In fact, the court's general conclusion was far more broadly
based: "We conclude that defendants, having opened a forum
for the expression of ideas by providing facilities for advertise-
ments on its buses, cannot for reasons of administrative con-
venience decline to accept advertisements expressing opinions
and beliefs within the ambit of First Amendment protec-
tion."" ' It is apparent from this quotation that it was the mere
act of providing advertising facilities that "opened the forum"
to protected speech, rather than the specific act of discriminat-
ing between classes of constitutionally protected speech.
Moreover, the WILPF court's argument that the forum
would not have been opened in Wirta had the district not per-
mitted some advertisements containing constitutionally pro-
tected political speech is further undercut by the fact that
commercial speech, in addition to political speech, is now con-
stitutionally protected under both the state and federal consti-
tutions.16 9 In light of this relatively recent constitutional
166. Id. at 36, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 580 (emphasis added)(quoting Wirta, 68 Cal. 2d at
56, 434 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 434). Accord Gonzales, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 1126, 226
Cal. Rptr. at 170 ("when a city allows some noncommercial messages to be displayed
in a street, under express provisions of an ordinance (citation omitted) or under a
permit system, it has 'opened the forum' for the expression of ideas").
167. Wirta, 68 Cal. 2d at 56-57, 430 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
168. Id at 55, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
169. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976)(The Court asked whether commercial speech "lacks all protec-
tion. Our answer is that it [does] not.")(note that Wirta predates this decision). C.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980)(" The Constitution ... affords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to
other constitutionally guaranteed expression. (Citation omitted.) The protection
available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expres-
sion and of the governmental interests served by its regulation."). See also Posados de
Puerto Rico Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1968)(upholding
Puerto Rico's law banning entirely truthful and non-misleading advertising, when-
ever aimed at the local populace, of lawful gambling in Puerto Rico's casinos); Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)(upholding the authority of a state bar to
discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, and under cir-
cumstances likely to pose dangers that the state may constitutionally prevent); Loska
v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 569, 233 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1986)(upholding a munici-
pal ordinance prohibiting the sale of, or offer to sell, tickets of admission to a public
assemblage in any public place); People v. Custom Craft Carpets, 159 Cal. App. 3d 676,
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change, it is even less likely that the kind of advertising al-
lowed would be considered in determining whether the forum
had been opened to advertising.
C. Commercial Speech vs. Political Speech Under the
California Constitution
A major concern of the court in Wirta was the "perverse"
discrimination in favor of commercial speech. 70  Although
commercial speech is now constitutionally protected, recent
federal and California case law stands for the proposition that
commercial speech is not entitled to the same level of protec-
tion as noncommercial speech. 17 The absurd results of in-
verting this hierarchy were recognized by the Wirta court:
A minimum of imagination is required to illustrate the para-
doxical scope of the district's policy. A cigarette company is
permitted to advertise the desirability of smoking its brand,
but a cancer society is not entitled to caution by advertisement
that cigarette smoking is injurious to health. A theater may
advertise a motion picture that portrays sex and violence, but
the Legion for Decency has no right to post a message calling
for clean films. A lumber company may advertise its wood
products, but a conservation group cannot implore citizens to
write to the President or Governor about protecting our natu-
ral resources. An oil refinery may advertise its products, but a
citizens' organization cannot demand enforcement of existing
air pollution statutes. 7 2
Now that commercial speech is constitutionally protected
206 Cal. Rptr. 12 (194)(holding it constitutionally permissible to compel an advertiser
to substantiate its advertising claims after it has been found to have misled the
public).
170. Wirta, 68 Cal. 2d at 57-58,434 P.2d at 986,64 Cal. Rptr. at 434 ("[T]he policy of
the district reverses... acceptable [constitutional] priorities and perversely gives pref-
erence to commercial advertising over nonmercantile messages .... The foregoing
prohibitions cannot be ascribed to whimsical or aberrant conduct of the district's man-
agement; they are vices inexorably resulting from any deliberate effort to circum-
scribe First Amendment rights .... ").
171. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63; Posadas de Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. at 2976;
Ohralik; 436 U.S. at 456; Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa, 39 Cal. 3d
501, 510-11, 703 P.2d 1119, 1123, 217 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229-30 (1985); Loska, 188 Cal. App.
3d at 581, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 219; Custom Croft Carpets, 159 Cal. App. 3d at 682-83, 206
Cal. Rptr. at 16. See also Wirta, 68 Cal. 2d at 57, 434 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
172. Wirta, 68 Cal. 2d at 57, 434 P.2d at 986-87, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 434-35. Accord
Gonzales, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 1125, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 169 ("Under the Santa Paula
ordinance, one could legally affix a commercial sign to a pole within the public right
of way which merely describes a product, but be criminally prosecuted for affixing a
similar sign with a message about the creation of the Bill of Rights.").
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and less vulnerable to regulation, the ironies recounted above
are even more likely, and no less disturbing, than they were at
the time they were originally fathomed by the Wirta court.
This reversal of free speech priorities was considered the most
constitutionally appalling result of the advertising policy in-
volved in Wirta. 17 3 With this in mind, it seems even more con-
stitutionally abhorrent that the WILPF court allowed a
complete ban on political messages. Deciding that an allowance
of some political advertising was required to open the forum,
the WILPF court never addressed this issue.174
D. Free Speech and the Right of Privacy Compared
The court of appeal relied heavily on Justice Douglas' con-
curring opinion in Lehman in concluding that the privacy
rights of commuters outweigh the expressive rights of persons
wishing to display noncommercial messages.'75 Although com-
mentators have been relentless in their criticism of the "captive
audience" analysis,17 the WILPF court incorporated this the-
ory into its ruling with virtually no analysis. 17 By focusing on
173. Wirta, 68 Cal.2d at 56-57, 434 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 434 ("Not only does
the district's policy prefer certain classes of ideas over others but it goes even further
and affords total freedom of the forum to merchantile messages while banning the
vast majority of opinions and beliefs extant which enjoy First Amendment protection
because of the noncommercialism.").
174. WILPF, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 41, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84 ("The Lehman consen-
sus appears to coincide with the commonplace public attitude that commercial adver-
tisements are not taken seriously and therefore have little or no speech value. In
effect, in Lehman the forum was not opened.").
175. Id., 237 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
Courts are well aware that public transportation exposes passengers to in-
creasingly unpleasant experiences. (Citations omitted.) Sensitivity to the
safety and personal feelings of passengers may permit reasonable restrictions
against forms of activity and expression which may come into conflict with
the constitutionally protected privacy rights of the passengers. In this case
the public entity chose to avoid advertisements which could not be restricted.
Id
176. See, e.g., 7he Supreme Cour4 1973 term, 88 HARv. L. REV. 149 (1974); Note,
The Public Forum." Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First Amendmen4 28
STAN. L. REv. 117, 139-48 (1975); Recent Decisions, Constitutional Law-Freedom qf
Speech-Public Forum-Captive Audience-Transit Advertising on Municipally
Owned Transit System, 13 DUQ. L. REv. 1003 (1975)[hereinafter Transit Advertising];
Recent Developments, Constitutional Law-The Public Forum in Non-Traditional
Areas-L.hman v. City of Shaker Heights, 51 WASH. L. REv. 142 (1975).
177. WILPF, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 41, 237 Cal. Rptr at 583 ("Although the Lehman
case has been severely criticized (citation omitted) the obvious concern of the plural-
ity justices and Justice Douglas for the privacy rights of the passengers was a realistic
one--even if it appears to be in conflict with the view that once any form of communi-
cation is allowed, no restrictions are permissible.").
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California's constitutionally mandated right to privacy, the
court failed to weigh seriously California's broad free speech
guarantees. 17
8
A captive audience has been described as "a group of persons
so situated that they have no alternative but to remain; they
have no choice but to hear and see what is said and shown to
them."' 79 Even given the scenario of a truly "captive audience,"
it is arguable that once a person's privacy has been invaded by
commercial ads, any additional invasion by political ads would
be nugatory. The court's assertion that commercial messages
are not taken seriously8s0 implies that they are somehow not as
potentially offensive as political messages. Facially, however, it
seems questionable that passengers would find an ad advocat-
ing noncompliance with the draft more offensive than, for ex-
ample, a commercial ad depicting women as empty-headed
sexual objects whose only goal in life is to have their make-up
on and their toilet bowls cleaned before their husbands get
home from work. The determination is properly a subjective
one. While the Supreme Court has noted that political adver-
tising "strike[s] at [our] prejudices and preconceptions and ha[s]
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an
idea,""8 it may be felt by some that commercial advertising typ-
ically degrades us by insulting our intelligence. It is not clear
that the latter is any less unsettling than the former. In addi-
tion, commercial speech is not always readily distinguishable
from political speech; after all, "the capacity of commercial
speech to communicate simultaneously political and social
messages can be discerned by anyone who gives second thought.
178. IdA; Article I of the California Constitution which reads in relevant part: "All
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are ... pursuing and obtaining ... privacy." Cal. Const. art. I, § 1.
179. Transit Advertising, supra note 176, at 1007, 1010. Studies of the interper-
sonal communication process reveal that human beings have an amazing ability to
tune out assaulting stimuli. This process, known as selective perception, enables us to
be discriminatory about what enters our minds. We are thereby able, in effect, to look
without seeing and hear without listening. Not only will our opinions and beliefs in-
fluence what we choose to perceive, they will also tend to distort messages that are
inconsistent with those ideals. We seek information that will enforce our present
world view, and ignore as much as possible that which might create cognitive disso-
nance. T. PATTERSON & R. McLURE, THE UNSEEING EYE, THE MYTH OF TELEvISION
POWER IN NATIONAL POLTICS 22 (1976); See generally M. SHERIF & C. SHERIF, ATmI-
TUDE EGO INVOLVEMENT AND CHANGE (1962); M. ROKEACH, THE OPENED AND CLOSED
MIND (1960); L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
180. WILP, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 41, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
181. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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to a public relations' advertisement by an industrial manufac-
turer of defense-related equipment...."182
Moreover, the captive audience doctrine is not invulnerable
to characterization as a straw man. It is a well-settled principle
that when a citizen leaves the privacy of his home, his interest
in avoiding intrusions is diminishedlas In this regard, public
transit buses are not private sanctuaries from which other per-
sons may be excluded as are homes and offices.'l 4 Additionally,
in seeking to avoid suppressing speech, recent California cases
have upheld intrusions into personal privacy far greater than
those entailed by bus placards.s
The court in Wirta considered privacy arguments and re-
jected them as follows:
It will undoubtedly be true, as defendants suggest, that an oc-
casional advertiser may post controversial messages which will
offend some, perhaps a majority, in the community. Free
speech inevitably encourages conflict and often rocks the boat.
Phlegmatic indeed is the individual who at some time has not
recoiled at the exercise of free speech by others. Annoyance
and inconvenience, however, are a small price to pay for pres-
ervation of our most cherished right.1
In short, the court of appeal's opinion in WILPF did not ap-
ply the strict standard required by the California Constitution.
Instead, the court misguidedly followed Lehman's much-criti-
cized "captive audience" theory. In allowing the privacy rights
of the transit system's passengers to prevail over the free
speech rights of the League, the court ignores recent California
182. U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs., 154 Cal. App. 3d at 1166, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 845
(quoting U.S.S.W. Africa/Nambia Trade and Cultural Council v. U.S., 708 F.2d at 769).
183. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1975)(filmed nudity visible
from outside drive-in theatre); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971)(jacket
bearing the slogan "Fuck the Draft"); Public Util. Comm'n. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,464
(1952).
184. The only California cases cited by the court of appeal in support of the city's
solicitude for its "captive" patrons involve criminal search and seizure issues in pri-
vate areas. For example, the court cited People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 710 P.2d 299,
221 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1985), for the proposition that privacy extends into some otherwise
public places. This case concerned defendant's fenced backyard. People reasonably
expect privacy in their own backyards. They have no such expectation in buses.
WILPF, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 41, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
185. See, e.g., Smith v. Silvey, 149 Cal. App. 3d 400, 197 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1983), where
the court overturned an injunction prohibiting a former mobile home park resident
from knocking on doors in the privately owned park to solicit support in a campaign
against the owner. The mobile home park owner had argued that the resident's pri-
vacy interest were more important than Smith's free speech rights.
186. Wirta, 68 Cal. 2d at 61-62, 434 P.2d at 989, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
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precedent consistent with the proposition that speech is enti-
tled to greater protection than privacy under the California
Constitution.
Conclusion
In determining whether a certain type of government prop-
erty or facility is a public forum, California courts must analyze
the nature of the forum and the degree to which it has been
dedicated to the use of speech. Although the category into
which a particular kind of property falls on the public forum
continuum is worthy of consideration, it is not conclusive. Ulti-
mately, the forum must be subjected to the basic incompatibil-
ity test, which requires the court to balance the importance of
the primary use for which the public property or facility was
intended and the degree to which that use will be disrupted if
access for speech is permitted. In the WILPF case, the court of
appeal need not have reached the question of whether the ad-
vertising space within a public transit bus is a public forum.
Rather, the Fresno Transit District's policy of providing space
for advertising opened the forum for that purpose and should
have been considered tantamount to a waiver of any argument
that certain kinds of advertisements would interfere with the
system's primary function of providing rapid, convenient and
pleasant transportation to its passengers.
It is unfortunate that the California Supreme Court passed
over this opportunity to clarify California's public forum doc-
trine and distinguish it from the federal standard. It is open to
speculation, however, whether WILPF represents a future
trend of the new California Supreme Court to interpret the
California Constitution more conservatively, thereby allowing
decisions to stand which rely on nonbinding federal precedent
in lieu of California's unique constitutional guidelines.
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